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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

DIONICIO BLANCO JR,

Case No. 20050251-CA

:

Defendant/Appellant

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of Assault by a Prisoner, a Thirddegree felony. The Defendant was found guilty by a jury on January 13, 2005,
and was sentenced on February 23, 2005. This Court has jurisdiction to hear
this appeal under U.C.A. §78-2a-3(e).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE
TO
INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE
OF
THE
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was properly preserved by timely
objections by defense counsel (R. 109 / 140-144). This issue should be
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review. "When reviewing a

trial court's decision to admit evidence under Rule 404(b), we apply an abuse
of discretion standard." State v. Widdison, 28 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2001). In
addition, this court should "review the record to determine whether the
admission of [prior] bad acts evidence was 'scrupulously examined' by the trial
judge 4in the proper exercise of that discretion.'" State v. Nelson-Wagonner, 6
P.3d 1120 (Utah 2000)(citations omitted).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(e). Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
U.C.A. § 76-5-102.5. Assault by prisoner.
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily injury, is
guilty of a felony of the third degree.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rule 403- Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion or
waste of time. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 404(b) other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
2

purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Rule 608(b)- Evidence of character and conduct of witness -Specific instances
of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of crime
as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may,
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1)
concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2)
concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness
as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
Rule 609(a)(1) &(2)- Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crimeevidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law which the witness was
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime
shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
Evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by information with assault by a prisoner in
violation of UCA §76-5-102.5. (R. 004-007). The Defendant was convicted at
jury trial. (R. 109). The Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of
0-5 years at the Utah State Prison.
During the trial, held on January 13, 2005, the State asked questions
concerning some shoes that the defendant had in his possession that were
termed illegal, as they violated jail policy. Defense counsel strenuously
3

objected to this evidence as violative of Rule 403 and 404 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence. The trial court, without making any specific findings regarding the
probative value and prejudicial effect, overruled defendant's objection.
The defendant was found guilty by the jury on January 13, 2005, and
sentenced on February 23, 2005. The Judgment, sentence and commitment was
entered on February 23, 2005 and the defendant filed a timely notice of appeal
on March 10, 2005.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 13, 2004 the defendant and the victim were both inmates in
the Weber County jail. The victim, Levi Hopper, was serving time on a felony
drug charge and was assigned to Delta Pod section 4. (R. 109 / 67). At this
time the defendant was also assigned to Delta-4 and was functioning in the
position of a trustee, or someone who had extra privileges and duties in the pod
in which they stayed (R. 109 / 69).
Mr. Hopper testified that he had borrowed some commissary items from
the defendant and on the morning of February 13th the defendant had requested
those items back from the victim (R. 109 / 72). The victim claimed that the
defendant seemed upset and kept asking for the commissary items to be
returned (R. 109 / 74). The victim turned to talk to another individual when he
was suddenly struck by someone who he thought was the defendant (R. 109 /
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75). The victim testified that there were other people around at the time and he
did not fully see the punch (R. 109 / 99). After being struck the victim fell to
the ground and the defendant approached the victim and told him to get up.
Upon the victim's refusal to rise the defendant began kicking him and stomped
on his chest (R. 109 / 76). Mr. Hopper claimed that the defendant hit him in the
left eye with his left hand and caused it to bleed (R. 109 / 78).
After the incident, the victim stayed in his cell until Officer Lemmon
approached him on a routine walk through and asked the victim what had
caused his eye to bleed (R. 109 / 86). Mr. Hopper told the officer that he had
been doing pushups and a drawer had fallen on him, cutting his eye. He asked
to be able to go to medical for treatment (R. 109 / 86-88). The victim claimed
he lied to Officer Lemmon because he didn't want to be labeled as a tattletale
in the jail (R. 109 / 87). After getting to the medical area the victim told him
that he had been hit by a guy known as "Junebug" who was the house mouse
(trustee) (R. 109 / 89). Mr. Hopper testified that he believed that Junebug's last
name was Blanco (R. 109 / 89).
Officer Lemmon testified that after the victim had told him that Junebug
was the one who assaulted him, he went to Delta pod and inspected the
knuckles of each inmate on that pod and found that the defendant's left hand
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was slightly swollen (R. 109 / 137). He also testified that no other inmate had
swollen knuckles.
Over the strenuous objection of defense counsel the trial court allowed
the officer to testify that several days after the incident he discovered and
confiscated a pair of illegal shoes from the defendant (R. 109 / 140-143).
Although the State claimed that knowing if the defendant was wearing illegal
shoes at the time of the incident would substantiate the injuries received(R. 109
/ 143), they put on no evidence to that effect, and in fact, the victim testified
that he did not recall what type of shoes the defendant was wearing at the time
(R.109/79).
Five days later, on February 18, 2004, the victim was released from the
jail and went to the hospital where he was diagnosed with two fractures around
his left eye and some residual nerve damage (R. 109 / 96, 97). Dr. Anderson
testified that he examined the victim and found fractures around his left eye
and treated Mr. Hopper by putting in three plates in the face around the eye (R.
109/113).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial was violated. There
was a specific instance where the trial court abused its discretion by allowing
the State to introduce prejudicial evidence against the Defendant.
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This error occurred during the trial when the trial court allowed the State
to introduce evidence of the Defendant's possession in the jail of some
"illegal" (in violation of jail rules) shoes. Defense counsel timely objected to
this evidence yet the Court failed to conduct a Rule 403 analysis to determine
whether the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.
The nature of this allegation was harmful to the defendant since the only
evidence regarding the commission of this offense was from another inmate
who testified that the assault occurred. The entire trial hinged on the credibility
of this witness, who had given two contradictory stories, and even the slightest
shift in believability of one over the other clearly affected the outcome of the
trial.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD ACT.
The trial of the defendant was held on January 13, 2005, and the jury

heard the testimony of three witnesses. In reality, however, the evidence
against the defendant consisted of one witness, the victim who claimed that the
defendant was the one who hit him and caused significant injuries. Dr. Douglas
Anderson, the treating physician several days after the incident testified as to
the injuries the victim received but could do nothing to affirm or dispute the
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identity of the assailant. Correctional Officer Robert Lemmon testified that he
observed the victim's injuries (a fact not in dispute at trial) and testified that the
victim originally told him that he had hurt himself doing pushups (R. 109 / 8688) Officer Lemmon further testified later the victim told him that the
defendant had hit him, which resulted in the officer examining the knuckles of
the inmates in the pod, looking specifically for the knuckles of the defendant,
and finding slight swelling on the defendant's left hand. (R. 109 /137)
Most damaging, however, was the testimony of Officer Lemmon
regarding the subsequent bad acts of the defendant over the objection of trial
counsel. He testified that the defendant had in his possession, several days
after the incident, some shoes that were in violation of jail policy. The
defendant objected to "anything happening a few day afterwards" and the
prosecutor told the court, "Judge, I think it goes to the same, the same issue."
Without further analysis, the court overruled the objection (R. 109 / 140,141).
Defense counsel then attempted to renew the objection by requesting a
voir dire of the witness (R. 109 / 142). Upon examination, the witness could
not testify that the shoes were in the defendant's possession at the time of the
incident (R. 109 / 142). Defense counsel again moved to strike the testimony
on relevancy grounds, which objection was again overruled (R. 109 /143). The
defendant tried once again to object claiming the evidence was "simply an
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attempt to prejudice the jury by saying he had some illegal shoes a couple of
days later (R. 109 /143), which the trial court again overruled (R. 109 / 144).
During this entire exchange the trial court made no rule 403 analysis, did
not consider the prejudicial effect to the defendant, and made no finding of the
probative value this evidence may have provided.
The State argued that this evidence would be relevant "based on the
injuries that Mr. Hopper [the victim] had and the fact that he was stomped on
the chest." (R. 109 / 143). The state never put on any evidence that would
establish that these injuries were more severe or more identifiable due to the
unauthorized shoes.
In State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court
stated that, "this Court has repeatedly held that evidence of other crimes may
not be admitted to prove that the defendant has a bad character or a disposition
to commit the crime charged." Id. at 1075.
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states,
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets
the requirements of 402 and 403.U.R.E. 404(b)(2002).
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In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that "[t]o give meaning to the policy
embodied in Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes must be reasonably
necessary and highly probative of a material issue." State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d
at 1075.
In State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme
Court held that for prior bad acts to be admissible at trial, there had to be "a
special relevance to a controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose other
than to show the defendant's predisposition to criminality." Id. at 426.
In State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) the defendant was
charged with rape from an incident that occurred in 1987. After the defendant
was charged for the 1987 offense, two women came forward and accused the
Defendant of raping them in 1985. The trial court allowed both women to
testify at the defendant's trial for the 1987 incident.
This Court found reversible error in allowing the two women to testify.
"We cannot conclude that the actions of defendant constitute a common design
or modus operandi. The similarities are common to many assault or rape cases
and are not peculiarly distinctive of defendant's conduct. Defendant's acts
were not so unique as to constitute a signature." Id. at 6. This Court also
found that the prior bad acts were too remote in time. "The two prior acts
occurred nearly two years before defendant was charged with a third, unrelated
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sexual assault. There is no apparent connection between defendant's earlier
conduct and his intent in relation to the 1987 rape charge.'5 Id.
In State v. Bradley, 57 P.3d 1139 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), this Court set
forth six factors that should be utilized when using the balancing test of Rule
403.
When conducting a Rule 403 review of prior bad acts evidence,
trial courts should consider several factors, including: (1) " fthe
strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other [bad
acts]/ " (2) " fthe similarities between the [charged offense and the
prior bad acts],1 " (3) " fthe interval of time that has elapsed
between the [charged offense and the prior bad acts],' " (4) " 'the
need for the evidence,1 " (5) " fthe efficacy of alternative proof,' "
and (6) " 'the degree to which the evidence will rouse the jury to
overmastering hostility.' " (citing State v. Widdison, 28 P.3d 1278
(Utah 2001)(quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 29L 295-96 (Utah
1988}).
In applying this analysis to the case at bar there, is simply no probative
value of the evidence admitted. (1) Although the strength of the evidence of the
subsequent bad act is not suspect, there was simply no evidence as to whether
the defendant had the shoes at the time of the incident and therefore this prong
was not met. (2) Although the prosecutor claimed she would establish
relevance to the charged offense, there was never any evidence produced to
show the probative value of the illegal shoes. (3) Several days had lapsed
between the assault and the officer finding the shoes in the defendant's
possession, which would at best show some diminutive probative value if there
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had been any evidence that the injuries could be somehow tied to the shoes
(such as blood splatters, etc.). (4) The was no articulable reason for the
introduction of this evidence to prove any of the elements of the offense
charged. (5) The State could conceivably claim the need of this evidence to
bolster a failing case. (6) Finally, the degree to which the evidence would
arouse the hostility of the jury is obvious based upon the claim that the
defendant had illegal contraband in the jail, was violating jail policy, and the
fact that the prosecution chose to introduce this totally irrelevant evidence in
the first place.
In the case of State v. Cravens, 15 P.3d 635 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) this
Court ruled that the admission of a defendant's prior burglary record in a trial
on a charge of threatening with a dangerous weapon constituted error. The
Court stated:
Accordingly, the nature of defendant's prior conviction for
burglary neither has any bearing on defendant's veracity as a
witness, nor is such a conviction admissible under Rule 609(a)(2).
In fact, we are unable to discern any probative value that
defendant's burglary conviction might have on the present matter.
(Id. At 638)
A final factor to be considered is the fact that the defendant never
testified at trial. Any possible attempt to impact the veracity of the defendant's
testimony would therefore be irrelevant, since the defendant did not take the
stand.
12

A. ANY PROBATIVE VALUE WAS OUTWEIGHED BY ITS
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT.
Even if evidence of other crimes has relevance beyond proving mere
criminal disposition, it is still subject to the protections of Rule 403 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence. State v. Cox, 787 P.2d at 5. The factors a court should
consider when weighing the probative value of prior conviction evidence
against its prejudicial effect are "the similarities between the crimes, the
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence,
the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably
will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." Id.
The trial Court did not do a Rule 403 analysis. It simply overruled the
defendant's several objections without any finding of probative value. Even
when defense counsel claimed the evidence was "irrelevant" and "prejudicial",
the court simply overruled the objection. Since the trial court failed to engage
in a Rule 403 analysis, this Court should reverse Defendant's conviction.
B.

IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS.

ADMIT

THE

In order to constitute reversible error, the error complained must "be
sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for the defendant in its absence." State .v Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656
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(Utah 1989). In State v. Cox. This Court said that "[although the State
presented evidence on which might be sufficient to sustain a rape conviction,
we are nevertheless persuaded that the jury may have reached a different result
in the absence of the highly prejudicial evidence of the prior sexual assaults."
State v. Cox, 787 P.2d at 7.
Informing the jury that the Defendant had illegal contraband in his
possession several days after the incident had no other purpose than to
prejudice the jury against the defendant. If the "taint" caused by inadmissible
evidence is sufficient, "it is irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted evidence
to support a verdict." State v. Mitchell 119 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989).
Because the prior bad act evidence is so highly prejudicial, the Defendant's
convictions should be reversed and the Defendant should receive a new trial.

CONCLUSION
Because of the errors that occurred during Defendant's trial, his right to
a fair trial was denied. It is very likely that the Defendant would have received
a more favorable result if the jury were unaware of his subsequent possession
of illegal contraband in the jail. Based on this irrelevant and prejudicial
evidence, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse his
conviction and grant him a new trial.
14

DATED this 2. daY of August 2005.

I^SDALL V{. RICHARUS
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
Mark Shurtliff Attorney General, Attorney.-fer.the PlaintiiTT^O East 300
South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854 SLC, Utah 8^114-0180, po);tage-i#epaid
this i. day of August 2005.
(RANDALL W. RICHARDfS
Attorney at Law
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ADDENDUM A
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1

Q

Okay.

2

A

After that -

3

Q

In addition to that, let's stop you there, in

4

addi-tion to that, youL said that you inventoried Mr. Blanco's

5

personal items; is that right?

6

A

Yes, ma'am.

7

Q

Were there anything, were there any items that were

8

conf iscated from him at that point that might be relevant to

9

this MR. GRAVIS:

10
11

Your Honor, we're going to object.

don' t even know where\ she's going with it.

[inaudible]

12

MS. NEIDER:

I'll tell you that it is.

13

MR. GRAVIS:

[inaudible].

14

THE COURT: [inaudible].
(Whereupon a sidebar was held)

15

THE COURT: Objection's overruled.

16
17
18
19

I

Q

(BY MS. NEIDER)

Officer Lemmon, is there something

that was confiscated or taken out of his property?
A

I have no recollection at that particular day of

20

taking any specific item from his property.

21

were several things taken.

22

level area and there's several things that are restricted to

23

him at that point.

24
25

I'm sure there

He was moved to a higher security

There was an instant, an instance a few days
after this incident -

140

MR. GRAVIS:

I'm going to object to anything

happening a few days afterwards, [inaudible]
THE COURT: Unless it's relevant to this.
MS. NEIDER:

Judge, I think it goes to the same, the

same issue.
THE COURT: Okay, all right, overruled.
Go ahead.
MS. NEIDER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Go ahead.
THE WITNESS:

There was an issue where Mr. Blanco had

some shoes that he was not authorized to have and as part of
another move he was taken out of his cell, moved to yet another
cell and those shoes were taken.
Q

(BY MS. NEIDER)

Okay, typically what do the inmates

wear in the jail for shoes?
A

Typically they have some, they're just called shower

shoes.
Q

Okay.

A

They're a soft rubber, more or less a sandal.

certain occasions inmates can have tennis shoes.

Now on

But the

jail's very picky about what shoes they will allow and will not
allow inmates to have.
Q

Okay, and the shoes that were taken from him wouldn't

have been the standard shower shoes; is that right?
A

No ma'am, they were not -
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Q

Okay.

A

- the standard jail issue shoes.

Q

Okay, and those were taken from his property a couple

of days after this incident happened with Mr. Hopper; is that
right?
A

Yes, ma'am, they were.

Q

Okay.
MR. GRAVIS:

Your Honor, may I voir dire the witness?

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. GRAVIS:
Q

Did you take the shoes?

A

I was a party to the taking of the shoes.

Q

Okay.

A

There were several officers involved.

Q

Okay, you were a party then.

Did you recall seeing

those shoes when you moved him out of D pod?
A

He was never moved out of D pod.

He was moved to

another area inside D pod.
Q

Well, did you see those shoes when you moved him the

first time?
A

When I, when we moved him the first time?

Q

Yeah.

A

Not to my recollection.
MR. GRAVIS:

whole thing.

Your Honor, I would move to strike the

Unless they can say he had those shoes at that
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time.

It's irrelevant anyway, but unless they can say he had

the shoes at the time the alleged incident occurred, it's
completely irrelevant.

It has no, has no bearing whatsoever.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. NEIDER:

Judge, I think it is relevant.

Based on

the injuries that Mr. Hopper had and the fact that he was
stomped on the chest.

If Mr. Gravis wants to argue to the

juryMR. GRAVIS:

Your Honor, the State has -

MS. NEIDER:

- the way they should -

MR. GRAVIS:

- no evidence -

MS. NEIDER:

- can I make my statement?

THE COURT: Let her finish the MS. NEIDER:

If Mr. Gravis wants to argue to the jury

the weight that that should be taken, that's fine.

But I think

that it is relevant and it should be admitted to the jury.
MR. GRAVIS:

Your Honor, there's absolutely -

THE COURT: Over, overruled.
MR. GRAVIS:

- no evidence

that

the

in, that

injuries were caused by any kind of particular shoes.

the

This is

simply an attempt to prejudice the jury by saying he had some
illegal shoes a couple days later.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. GRAVIS:

When they can't even prove he had the

shoes the day of this alleged incident occurred.
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1

THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection, go ahead.

2

MS. NEIDER:

3

THE COURT: Cross?

5

7
8

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. GRAVIS:
Q

How long you been a corrections officer here in Weber

County?

9

A

Just over two years.

10

Q

Just over two years.

11

Judge, I don't

have any other questions for Officer Lemmon.

4

6

Thank you, Your Honor.

Do you know how old the jail is

over there on 12th Street?

12

A

I believe we're pushing either four or five years.

13

Q

Four or five years, so it's a pretty new jail, pretty

14

state of the art, correct?

15

A

It is quite new.

16

Q

And the pods and the sections of the pods they have a

17

common area, day room, is on the same level as the control room

18

outside of the cell, outside the pod, right?

19
20

A

It is outside of the pod.

I wouldn't say exactly the

same level, but pretty darn close.

21

Q

And it's glass, right?

Or clear material?

22

A

Yes, sir.

23

Q

Very easy to see through?

24

A

Yes, sir.

25

Q

Okay, and then the upper cells are, but then the cells
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 041901320 FS

DIONICIO JR BLANCO,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

ERNIE W JONES
February 23, 2 005

PRESENT
Clerk:
vennaw
Prosecutor: NEIDER, CAMILLE L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GRAVIS, MARTIN V
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 8, 1971
Video
Tape Number:
J0223 05
Tape Count: 2:25
CHARGES
1. ASSAULT BY PRISONER
Plea: Not Guilty

3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: 01/13/2005 Guilty

HEARING
This is the time set for sentencing. Camille Neider is present
representing the State of Utah. Martin Gravis is present
representing the defendant. Attorney Gravis addresses the Court
The defendant addresses the Court. Ms. Neider submits.
The Court proceeds with sentencing.
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Case No: 041901320
Date:
Feb 23, 2005
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ASSAULT BY PRISONER a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The sentence in this case may run concurrently with the sentence
the defendant is currently serving. The defendant is authorized
credit for all time previously served in this case.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The defendant shall pay restitution in the amount of $14,368.23, to
be remitted as follows: $840.00 to Levi Hopper, and $13,528.23 to
the Weber County Correctional Facility which paid Mr. Hopper's
medical bills.

Dated this

^

day of

/

20 <* jT".

^ W •f

ERNIE W JONES
District Court Judge
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